







Analysing the database made available by the European Central Bank and by the European Banking 
Authority, we evaluate the Comprehensive Assessment (Asset Quality Review and Stress Test) of 
banks carried out in 2014. In a nutshell, the main results are: i) risk-adjusted capital ratios are 
negatively related to the Asset Quality Review shortfall, but not to the Stress Test shortfall, whereas 
the leverage ratio plays a significant role in both cases; ii) the Comprehensive Assessment 
predominantly concentrated on traditional credit activity rather than on banks' financial assets; iii) 
the Comprehensive Assessment seems to be characterized by double standards. The Asset Quality 
Review was severe with banks operating in non-core countries, while medium-sized banks were 
either riskier or were treated severely in both exercises. The analysis leads to a puzzle: 
comparatively, the assessment per se led to significant adjustments for solid banks and large 
shortfalls for weak banks. The puzzle can be resolved by referring to the legacy of the country’s 
former supervisory activity and to the low level of capitalization of weak banks mostly in peripheral 
countries. 
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The Comprehensive Assessment (CA) performed by the European Central Bank (ECB) and the 
European Banking Authority (EBA) in 2014 marked an important step towards the European 
Banking Union. In autumn 2013, European institutions changed the banking supervisory system by 
establishing the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) in the Eurozone. The publication of CA results, 
just few days before the start of the SSM, was intended to accomplish two main tasks: first, to 
define a level playing field, harmonizing different (national) approaches to bank supervision, and 
second to quantify the risks of European banks in order to determine an appropriate level of 
capitalization.
 1
 The first task was mainly addressed through the Asset Quality Review (AQR) and the 
second through the Stress Test (ST) analysis based on two different scenarios: a baseline scenario 
and an adverse scenario. 
The two exercises complement each other, but they were run in different ways. The AQR was 
performed by national supervisory authorities under the supervision of the ECB; this review led to 
an harmonization among national supervisory approaches and to €48 billion (bn) of adjustments to 
bank assets (ECB, 2014a).
2
 The two scenarios of the ST were country specific, the baseline scenario 
was derived from the European Commission’s three year forecasts and the adverse scenario was 
obtained through a downward perturbation of the baseline scenario; the capital adjustment related 
to the adverse ST scenario was €263 bn yielding a median 4% reduction in the Common Equity Tier 
1 (CET1) ratio (ECB, 2014a). 
The literature on the CA is rather limited. There are papers aiming at establishing its capability to 
capture bank risk,
3
 and papers studying the market reaction in terms of cumulative abnormal 
                                                           
1
 We recall that by the end of 2013 banking supervision was fully in the hands of national authorities and that the CA 
can be considered the first act of the ECB as a supervisory authority of the banking system. Before the CA, national 
authorities adopted different standards concerning the evaluation of assets/loans, the capital buffer (the quality/level 
of CET1 capital) and the implementation of Basel III (national discretion in the phase-in process). 
2
 Harmonization concerned several issues, such as: the definition of non-performing exposures, impairment triggers, 
provisioning approaches for going concern non-performing exposures, collateral valuation, point-in-time collective 
provisioning and credit valuation adjustment calculation. 
3
 We refer to Acharya and Steffen (2014) and Barucci et al. (2016) on the capability of the CA to effectively capture bank 
risk. Acharya and Steffen (2014) discovered that there is a negative relationship between the capital deficit determined 
by the CA and bank risk according to the benchmark adopted in their analysis (SRISK); if the total losses detected by the 
CA are considered, then the relationship turns out to be positive. They suggest that these contradictory results are 
mainly due to the use of risk weights in the regulatory capital benchmark and that the results can be reconciled by 




returns to the announcement of the results of the CA and to the publication of banks' shortfalls.
4
 
Recently Fiordelisi et al (2017) have analysed the effect of the SSM on banks' lending: they show 
that banks subject to the SSM supervisory reduced their lending activity more than the other ones. 
In this paper we analyse in detail the ECB's dataset published with the disclosure of CA definitive 
results. The assessment was followed by a debate concerning its capability to capture bank risk and 
the possibility of double standards with respect to banks' business models and their country of 
origin. Following the publication of CA results, there has been a discussion on the press, mainly in 
Italy, the European banking market with the largest capital deficit. After the disclosure of the CA, 
the former Italian prime minister and former president of the European Commission Romano Prodi 
said: «The referee whistled strangely. […] I would be curious to know how the German Landesbank 
not included in the examinations would be judged».
5
  Even the Bank of Italy (2014) criticized some 
CA’s hypotheses, underlying the fact that the adverse scenario implies a collapse of the Italian 
economy.
6
 Implicitly, they argued that core countries have benefited from a softer treatment, this 
criticism has also been renewed recently (see, e.g., Reuters, 2017). To the best of our knowledge, 
these issues have not been addressed in the literature. In what follows, we aim to identify the main 
lessons of the CA. In particular, our purpose is to evaluate its main drivers and to ascertain 
discontinuities with respect to the previous national regulatory/supervisory standards.  
In this perspective, we investigate the determinants of the capital shortfall of a bank, considering 
two different measures: i) the shortfall with respect to the 8% CET1 ratio threshold after the AQR 
exercise, and ii) the shortfall under the ST in the adverse scenario with respect to the 5.5% CET1 
ratio threshold. The shortfall is provided by the absolute value of the threshold minus the capital 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
positively related to the volatility of a bank and therefore the CA seems to be aligned with a historical (backward-
looking) measure of a bank’s riskiness. 
4
 Two event study analyses (Sahin and de Haan, 2015; Carboni et al. 2017) examine the impact on banks’ stock prices of 
CA announcements, on the 23 October 2013, and of CA results, on the 26 October 2014. They consider the subset of 
listed banks. Sahin and de Haan (2015) find heterogeneity in cumulative abnormal returns across countries in the Euro 
area, instead Carboni et al. (2017) find that banks under direct ECB supervision registered a more negative market 
reaction with respect to banks maintaining national supervisors. 
5
 Our translation from Italian. The statement is taken from Corriere della Sera, one of the main Italian daily newspapers 
(Massaro, 2014).  
6
 Other CA characteristics have been criticized by the governor of Bank of Italy, Ignazio Visco. In front of the Italian 
Parliament he declared «stress test results were strongly affected by partial removal of the possibility of sterilizing – 
through a special prudential filter – the effect of changes in the value of sovereign bonds […] However, no 
"harmonization" of other national discretions was made […] then it was adopted, with a decision that we have not 
shared and challenged in a formal way, an asymmetric approach to the national discretion» (Visco, 2014, pp. 6-7. Our 
translation from Italian). 
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ratio after the exercise floored at zero. Our main findings are as follows: a) the outcome of the CA 
was biased against banks specialized in traditional activity; b) the leverage ratio performs better 
than the CET1 ratio in capturing the shortfall of the ST; c) the shortfall seems to depend on the 
legacy of national regulatory/supervisory activity. 
As can be noticed from a purely descriptive analysis, the AQR concentrated predominantly on 
traditional credit activity rather than on the assets detained by banks: only €1.4 bn of the AQR 
adjustments were due to asset evaluation adjustments, while €3.1 bn came from the revision of 
credit valuation adjustment (CVA) values and €43 bn came from credit adjustments (ECB, 2014a). 
This evaluation is confirmed by our analysis: the AQR shortfall and the ST shortfall are positively 
affected by the role of credit activity, but are not influenced by the presence of financial assets 
evaluated at fair value, even when they are extremely difficult to evaluate (level 3 assets).  
Our analysis sheds some light on the banking capital dispute. As expected, the AQR shortfall is 
negatively affected by the CET1 ratio and by the leverage ratio; however, we show that the ST 
shortfall is only affected by the leverage ratio. These results suggest that the ECB and the EBA do 
not recognize manipulation in the risk weights, but in any case a pure leverage ratio was able to 
capture bank’s risks (as an outcome of the stress tests) better than a risk-adjusted capital ratio. This 
result reinforces the scepticism concerning the reliability of risk-weighted capital ratios following 
the financial crisis (for European stress tests in 2011 and in 2014, see e.g. Acharya et al., 2014; 
Acharya and Steffen, 2014; EBA, 2011; Haldane,2012).
7
 
Our results provide some evidence that the shortfall of the AQR and of the ST depends on the 
country in which the bank group is incorporated. Banks located in peripheral countries were 
treated severely in comparison to those of core countries.
8
  
These results on the shortfall are not easy to interpret because of the interplay of two different 
arguments: the design of the AQR and of the ST, the starting level of capitalization of banks. As a 
matter of fact, a bank with certain features may end up with a significant SF either because of the 
                                                           
7
 Scepticism was reinforced by the fact that the large variation observed in the risk-weighted assets was not driven by 
banks’ business models or risk profiles: there thus remains room for supervisory and managerial practices (see Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2013a, 2013b; Cannata et al., 2012; EBA, 2013; Haldane, 2011; Le Leslé and 
Avramova, 2012).  
8
 Hereinafter, we assess the supervisor’s activity as soft (severe) towards a set of banks when, considering also a set of 
controls for other features, there is a low (large) impact in terms either of shortfall or of adjustment (CET1 reduction as 
a result of the exercise). 
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design of the CA or because the bank was undercapitalized. To evaluate the two different 
hypotheses, we go through the analysis of the adjustments, i.e., the difference in the CET1 ratio 
before and after the CA’s tests. In this case the initial capital ratio doesn’t play any role and 
therefore the analysis is only about the design of the CA. The results for the adjustments of the ST 
are striking: banks with good credit quality (low non-performing loans) and less leveraged were 
affected by greater adjustments. This evidence suggests that the CA was softer towards 
riskier/weaker banks. 
As the evidence concerning the capital shortfall and that related to the adjustment partly goes in 
opposite directions, we can conclude that the dependence of the shortfall on some banks’ features 
is not due to the design of the assessment, in particular of the ST. The puzzle seems to be mostly 
related to the low starting capital buffer for banks characterized by poor credit quality and located 
in non-core countries.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the database and the empirical model. 
In Section 3 we present our main results on the shortfall of the AQR and of the ST. In Section 4 we 
provide further evidence and in Section 5 we provide an analysis of the adjustments to discern 
among the different hypotheses behind the results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Data set and empirical model 
We analyse bank-level data from the ECB with respect to adjustments and shortfalls after the AQR 
and the ST. The CA involved 130 banks for the AQR with total assets of €22 trillion (tr) and risk-
weighted assets (RWAs) of €8.5 tr, which account for 81.6% of the banking system under the 
umbrella of the SSM (for the complete list of banks, see ECB, 2014b); 103 of these financial 
institutions were also involved in the ST analysis.
9
 The AQR focused on bank assets as at the end of 
2013, while the ST performed a scenario analysis on a three-year window up to 2016. Our sample is 
made up of 129 banks operating in the euro area (see Table 1), using the dataset provided by the 
ECB.
10
 The dataset includes some general information on bank accounts before and after the CA 
                                                           
9
 The difference between AQR and ST samples is due to banks controlled by large banking groups (25 cases) and by two 
main clearing houses. 
10
 We omit data from Deutsche Bank Malta because of the abnormal CET1 ratio (281%). 
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(sections A, B, C and F) and a breakdown of credit exposure, CVA and the level 3 component of 
market exposure (section D). Furthermore, related to banks’ credit exposure, the ECB also provides 
a detailed analysis of non-performing exposures (NPEs) and coverage ratio (CR) of NPEs in section 
E.
11
 We also take into consideration data from the EBA with respect to credit risk and the market 
risk relevant to the ST.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Total gross loans over total assets in 2013 are from the Bankscope database while the stock 
exchange market capitalizations and the gross domestic product (GDP) figures are 2013 values from 
the World Bank database. Definitions and descriptive statistics of all the variables used in the 
empirical analysis are reported in Table 2. In Table 3 we report the mean value of the main 
variables by country.  
[Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here] 
Our research strategy is to estimate the shortfall of a bank associated with the AQR threshold and 
the shortfall associated with the ST under the adverse scenario.
12
 In what follows, we refer 
respectively to the two shortfalls as SF_AQR and SF_ST. The capital shortfalls are obtained as the 
absolute value of the differences (floored at zero) between the CET1 ratio obtained after the AQR 
and after the ST and the associated thresholds (8% for the AQR and 5.5% in 2016 post ST under the 




The focus of the CA on the CET1 ratio to assess the potential shortfall of a bank implies that this 
risk-weighted capital–asset ratio should well represent bank risks. A pure descriptive analysis 
provides mixed evidence. Looking at the bivariate relation between the ratio of non-performing 
exposures over total exposures and the CET1 ratio (both measured before the CA), we find only a 
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 In ECB (2014c), a NPE is defined as i) “every material exposure that is 90 days past due even if it is not recognised as 
defaulted or impaired”; ii) “every exposure that is impaired”; iii) “every exposure that is in default according to CRR”. 
CR is defined as the ratio between the specific or collective allowances for losses incurred or not incurred and the NPE. 
12
 We also considered as dependent variable the shortfall of the CA as a whole which is given by the maximum of the 
shortfalls of the AQR, of the ST under the baseline scenario and of the ST under the adverse scenario. We obtained 
results similar as in the case of SF_ST and as a consequence we omitted them. 
13
 We opted to consider SF as our dependent variable, instead of the uncensored buffers after the CA, because under 
the CA’s rules the bank has to submit a detailed plan on how to fill the capital gap only in the case of a positive SF, while 
for close to zero buffers no actions are required. 
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mild negative link (Figure 1). However, as expected, the relation between CET1 ratio (measured 
before the CA) and the capital shortfalls associated with the AQR and the ST shows that the 
shortfalls are mainly concentred on the banks with lower starting point levels of CET1 ratio (Figure 
2). 
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
To deeply investigate the determinants of the shortfalls, we run a multivariate analysis. As 
determinants of the shortfalls, we consider a set of exogenous variables that are available from the 
ECB and EBA database and other sources. We start with the following reference model: 
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(1) 
where _ denotes the AQR or the ST shortfalls of bank i, expressed in euro bn.14 In the model we 
include two types of exogenous variables: bank-specific variables (lower case i) and a country-
specific variable (lower case j) that refers to the country in which the bank holding company is 
located. The correlation matrix for the exogenous variables is reported in Table 4.
 15
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
We control for the size of the bank by introducing two dummy variables:
16
 i) Dmediumsize, which is 
equal to 1 if total assets of bank i are larger than the first quartile and lower than the third one and 
to 0 otherwise; ii) Dlargesize, which is equal to 1 if total assets of bank i are larger than the third 
quartile and to 0 otherwise. Bank size provides a control variable for the level of the shortfall: 
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 As a robustness test, we also considered the logarithm of the SF_AQR and of the SF_ST expressed in euro millions, 
imposing a minimum value of zero for banks recipient of a null shortfall. We also estimated equation (1) considering a 
logit model with a dichotomous (0, 1) endogenous variable depending on whether the shortfall was null or positive. We 
obtained results similar to those presented below and therefore they are omitted. 
15
 As reported in Table 5, a positive shortfall is observed in 16 (23) banks for the AQR (ST) over a sample of 129 
observations. The limited number of non null observations may conflict with the number of covariates (10/11 
depending on the model considered). To cope with this issue, we also estimated more parsimonious versions of our 
empirical model. The main results are robust to this test. More specifically, we considered a more parsimonious model 
for the shortfalls with only four explanatory variables (cet1/lr, npe, cr, sys) or five (with loan). We also considered a 
different set of four explanatory variables (npe, cr, sys, 1-Dcore) and the interaction between Dcore and cet1, lr and 
npe, respectively. Results are available on request. 
16
 We include dummy variables and not the level of total assets in order to limit the multicollinearity problem with 
other exogenous variable. 
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ceteris paribus, the shortfall is likely to be affected positively by the size of the balance sheet.
17
 The 
attitude of the supervisory authority towards a bank may depend on its size for several reasons: on 
the one hand, a large bank is more likely to be supervised by the market and therefore the need for 
intervention from the supervisory authority should be less intense; on the other hand, a large bank 
is riskier from a systemic risk perspective, thus potentially making supervision softer or more 
severe. To investigate further how the bank’s relevance affects the CA exercise, we also consider 
the ratio of the assets of the bank over the nominal GDP of the country in which the bank is 
incorporated (sys). This ratio should explicitly capture the systemic relevance associated with a 
bank in terms of the relationship between size and systemic risk (see e.g. Laeven et al., 2014).  
The dispute concerning the risk-weighted capital requirement leads us to introduce the CET1 ratio 
(cet1) as an exogenous variable. If the capital ratio is a reliable indicator of the bank’s solidity, it 
should have a negative effect on the size of the shortfall for the AQR and for the ST. Note that the 
shortfalls are defined with respect to CET1 ratio thresholds and thus (in a mechanical way) a lower 
shortfall should be associated with a higher CET1 ratio as a starting point (both for the AQR and for 
the ST). The denominator of the capital ratio is made up of RWAs, which implies that banks 
detaining risky assets are obliged to detain a large amount of capital. Therefore, if the RWA 
computation effectively reflects the riskiness of assets, banks with a higher capital ratio should also 
be more resilient to shocks and therefore the shortfalls of the AQR and of the ST should be smaller.
 
According to the Basel II/III framework, if regulatory and supervisory activities work properly, then 
the CET1 ratio should provide exhaustive information about the soundness of the bank and other 
indicators of capital solidity should be redundant. To evaluate this point, we also consider the 
leverage ratio computed as CET1 capital over total assets (lr) and measured according to the Capital 
Requirements Regulation (CRR) under the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD). It should be noted 
that the dispute on risk-adjusted versus non-risk-adjusted capital ratios is not settled and it is 
difficult to establish which type of capital ratio captures the riskiness of a bank to a greater extent.
18
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 Another way of addressing this size effect would be to consider the shortfall in terms of basis points (bps). We opted 
to present our results for the level of the shortfall rather than for the basis point shortfall because in the latter case the 
capital is at the denominator yielding a possible bias with the exogenous variables that are also related to capital. 
Nevertheless, we also performed regressions for the SF in bps and the main results obtained in our analysis are 
confirmed. 
18
The evidence in the literature is mixed. There is some evidence showing that a higher Tier1 capital ratio negatively 




To fully investigate the CA, we analyse how the composition of the balance sheet affects the 
shortfall. Credit quality is considered including the ratio of non-performing exposures over total 
exposures (npe) and the coverage ratio for non-performing exposures (cr), i.e. the ratio between 
credit loss provision funds and non-performing exposures. As far as the asset component is 
concerned, we consider the proportion of level 3 assets to total assets (level3).
19
 Note that if RWAs 
adequately assess risks, then these variables should not affect the shortfall. 
For the country-specific variables, we consider stock exchange market capitalization over nominal 
GDP (marketcap). Our goal is to control for a market discipline effect that may substitute 
supervisory scrutiny: banks located in a well-developed financial market may be characterized by 




We complete our analysis by inserting the dummy variable Drestruct, which takes a value equal to 1 
in the case of a bank undergoing a restructuring process before 31 December 2013 and 0 
otherwise. A restructuring plan for a bank is usually accompanied by an intense activity by the 
supervisory authority, deleveraging/cleaning of the books and public or private capital injections. 
Thus, this variable should allow us to control for capital deficiencies before the 2014 CA.
21
  
Banks may choose to evaluate risk weights according to an internal model instead of the standard 
formula. To capture this feature, we include the dummy variable Dirb, which takes a value equal to 
1 in the case of a bank with more than 50% of its RWAs computed according to the internal rating 
model (a value quite similar to the median in the sample analysed) and zero otherwise. We expect a 
negative effect from this variable on the CA’s shortfall if the supervisor is not confident about the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Mariathasan and Merrouche, 2012). Some other papers show that a higher capital ratio (but also a higher leverage 
ratio) was related to better market performance during the crisis (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012;Das and Sy, 2012; Demirgüç-
Kunt et al., 2013). Vallascas and Hagendorff (2013) find a statistically significant relationship between risk density (risk-
weighted assets over assets) and bank volatility. As far as predicting bank distress is concerned, Betz et al. (2013) and 
Haldane (2012) show that leverage has greater predictive power than risk-weighted asset measures, whereas Estrella et 
al. (2002) show that their performance is similar (with a preference for the leverage ratio). 
19
 According to the International Financial Reporting Standards (see IFRS 13), level 3 assets are those assets that need to 
be valued using models (mark-to-model) in the absence of observable market data. 
20
 We also controlled for the performance of the national economy including GDP growth; the variable turned out to be 
strongly correlated with balance sheet indicators of credit quality and for this reason we opted to eliminate this 
variable.  
21
 To check whether the effect of Drestruct could be due to an endogeneity effect, we ran a robustness test in which all 
the banks under restructuring plans (24 institutions) were excluded from the analysis. The main results are confirmed. 
 10 
 
capacity of internal models to capture the riskiness of banking activities and/or suspects 
manipulation of risk weights.
22
 
We estimate equation (1) using a Tobit estimator, which overcomes the problem of inconsistent 
results derived from using the ordinary least squares estimator when the dependent variable is 
censored, see Wooldridge (2002). As suggested by Cameron and Trivedi (2005), we check for 
distributional misspecification in the error terms. In the estimation outputs we report the LM test 
of the Tobit specification, which checks for linearity, homoskedasticity and normality assumptions. 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
The reference model is estimated and the results are reported in Table 5.
23
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
As first step, we consider a restricted version of equation (1). We include the CET1 ratio and the 
leverage ratio separately, respectively in models I and IV and in models II and V with regarding to 
SF_AQR and SF_ST. Collinearity does not emerge in any model using both a variance inflation factor 
(VIF) diagnostic and a condition index.
24
 However, models II and IV do not pass the LM test of Tobit 
specification at the 10% level of confidence, suggesting that the Tobit specification is unsuitable. 
Thus, in what follows, we do not comment the results for models II and IV.  
cet1 negatively affects the shortfall of the AQR (model I), lr negatively affects the shortfall of the ST 
(model V). In models III and VI, we estimate equation (1) without restrictions (both cet1 and lr are 
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 There is considerable evidence showing that banks use the discretion of Basel II agreements (mostly the internal 
rating-based approach) to reduce RWAs (see Beltratti and Paladino, 2013; Benh et al., 2014; Mariathasan and 
Merrouche, 2014). According to their interpretation, banks exploit the flexibility of the internal model of Basel II to 
underestimate their risks, see also Le Leslé and Avramova (2012) and Das and Sy (2012). Accounting standards provide 
a further source of manipulation: Huizinga and Laeven (2012) and Bushman and Williams (2012) document accounting 
discretion during the financial crisis by banks. The Basel III system allows country-specific discretionary measures in the 
phase-in period, which may introduce a further ‘‘manipulation’’ at the country level. 
23
 In Table 5, and in the following tables, we report the pseudo R-squared which is equal to 1 minus the ratio between 
the full model log-likelihood and the constant-only one, as evaluated by “tobit” instruction in Stata13. Note that pseudo 
R-squared should be considered with caution in case of Tobit regressions also because it can give values lower than 0 
and higher than 1 (see e.g. Wooldridge, 2002, p. 529).  
24
 As rule of thumb for VIF (condition index), we consider a conservative level of 2.5 (15), while values greater than 5 




included). The inclusion of both capital ratios does not create concern about multicollinearity. As 
expected, we find that a high CET1 ratio negatively affects the shortfall of the AQR (model III) 
25
: on 
average, adding one percentage point of cet1 implies a €0.10 bn lower shortfall.
26
 On the other 
hand, the leverage ratio turns out to be not significant. Considering SF_ST, the results are reversed: 
the relationship with cet1 is not confirmed, while the lr coefficient is negative and highly significant 
(model VI). An additional one percentage point of lr implies, on average, a €0.60 bn lower shortfall 
after the ST.  
These results suggest that a high CET1 ratio allowed to escape a shortfall after the revision of the 
balance sheet by the ECB through the AQR. This outcome seems to signal that the ECB and the EBA 
did not detect risk weight manipulation. This interpretation is confirmed by the coefficient 
associated with the dummy variable measuring whether a bank relies on the internal rating 
approach (Dirb), which negatively affects the shortfall of the AQR, while the variable is not 
significant when the SF_ST is considered. From this evidence, we can deduce that according to the 
CA, the adoption of the internal-based model is not associated with risk weight manipulation.  
On the other hand, when the shortfall of the ST is analysed we observe that a high CET1 ratio 
doesn’t guarantee the bank to end up above the threshold after the ST. Instead a high leverage 
ratio allows to pass the ST. This outcome could be due to the static balance sheet assumption made 
in the ST, which implies that banks maintain the same business mix and model throughout the time 
horizon. Under this assumption, any mitigating action by banks is precluded. Therefore, the impact 
of the ST is likely to be parametrized to total assets, and therefore to the leverage ratio, rather than 
to risk weighted assets and therefore to CET1 ratio. 
Taking into account the unrestricted version of equation (1), we observe that both Dmediumsize 
and Dlargesize variables have a positive and significant effect on SF_AQR (model III). On the other 
hand, we find that only Dmediumsize coefficient, but not the one of Dlargesize, is positive and 
significant when SF_ST is considered (model VI). The fact that large banks were not considered 
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 To check whether the results related to cet1 are mainly driven by a mechanical effect, due to the choice to focus the 
CA on thresholds based on CET1 ratio, we consider a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if a bank has a CET1 ratio 
higher than the median value at the country level and 0 otherwise. In this way, we introduce nonlinearity in the 
exogenous variable. As the main results are confirmed, we can affirm that the mechanical factor is not the unique 
explanation for the results. 
26




riskier by the ST (and therefore by the CA as a whole) is confirmed by the negative and significant 
coefficient associated with the variable capturing the systemic nature of the bank (sys). These 
results can be interpreted in different ways. It may be that supervisors are captive to large banks or 
that large banks were able to evaluate their assets more carefully or possibly were subject to 
greater supervision after the Lehman Brothers default because of the “too big to fail” problem. 
Supervision by the market (of large banks) may also be the root of the results. As a matter of fact, a 
well-developed financial market (represented by the variable marketcap) negatively affects both 
SF_AQR and SF_ST. This result could be related to the role of market supervision (Basel II/III’s third 
pillar), which complements the activity of the supervisory authority (Basel II/III’s second pillar).  
Looking at the composition of the balance sheet, we observe that the shortfall both of the AQR and 
of the ST is inflated by the ratio of non-performing loans, representing an indicator of the quality of 
credit. Lower quality (higher ratio) induces a more significant shortfall. The phenomenon is 
balanced by the fact that a high coverage ratio of non-performing loans negatively affects the 
shortfall of the AQR, while in the case of ST the effect is not significant. It seems that national 
authorities and the ECB recognized provisions as a safeguard for non-performing exposures, which 
were not able to help to attain a positive buffer after the ST. Surprisingly, the proportion of level 3 
assets over total assets does not affect the shortfall of either the AQR or the ST. This outcome and 
the fact that the adjustments associated to level-3 assets are mostly negligible and concentrated in 
a few banks,
27
 suggest that the CA failed to capture their risks and to provide a critical analysis of 
the value of assets and derivatives. 
The role of restructuring plans (Drestruct) is significant and robust as the specification varies: a bank 
under restructuring is characterized by a higher shortfall of the AQR (€0.5 bn on average) and of the 
ST (€1.0 bn).  
 
4. Further evidence 
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 For example, the total impact on derivatives was only €0.2 bn, 60% of which was due to just one institution (Banque 
populaire Caisse d’Epargne). 
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In what follows, we consider the unrestricted model and we further analyse the results of the CA. 
We develop our analysis in two directions: i) examining the risk composition of the balance sheet 
and ii) comparing banks by country of origin. 
In Table 6 we investigate how the RWA composition affects SF_AQR and SF_ST. We consider three 
different measures of balance sheet composition: i) risk density, i.e. RWAs over total assets (rwa), 
where a higher ratio signifies that the assets are riskier; ii) the share of total gross loans over total 
assets (loan);
28
 the overall exposure (credit and government bonds) to the country where the bank 
is incorporated over total exposure (homebias).
29
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
We observe that the rwa coefficient is positive and statistically significant when SF_AQR is 
considered (model I). Considering the shortfall associated with the ST, we find that the model IV do 
not pass the LM test of Tobit specification at the 10% level of confidence, suggesting that the Tobit 
specification is unsuitable. It seems that the riskiness of the assets drives the shortfall associated 
with the AQR, but we cannot draw conclusions about the effect of rwa in the ST. Instead, both 
SF_AQR and SF_ST are affected by loan (models II and V) and are not affected by the share of total 
exposure to the country in which the bank is located (model III and VI). We interpret these results 
as evidence that credit specialization is associated with a higher shortfall in the CA, but there is no 
evidence of home bias. 
As mentioned in the introduction, the CA exercise was followed by a debate about the possibility 
that the ECB and the EBA adopted double standards with respect to banks depending on their 
country of origin; to address this point, we provide some regressions considering among the 
exogenous variables a dummy variable (Dcore), which assumes a value equal to 1 in the case that a 
bank is incorporated in one of the core countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands) and 0 otherwise (peripheral countries). In Tables 7 and 8 we 
provide some regressions for SF_AQR and SF_ST, respectively.  
                                                           
28
 We exclude banks with loan higher than 1 from the sample. However, results are robust to the inclusion of these 
observations. 
29
 We also considered i) the gross exposure to government bonds of the country where the bank is incorporated over 
total gross government exposure and ii) the ratio of corporate and retail credit risk exposure over total credit risk 
exposure and the assets in the banking book. We omit regressions with these exogenous variables because they are 
either weakly statistically significant or not significant. 
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[Insert Tables 7 and 8 about here] 
We introduce the variable 1-Dcore and then we interact Dcore and 1-Dcore with four different 
exogenous variables: i) CET1 ratio; ii) leverage ratio; iii) non-performing exposure; iv) coverage 
ratio. To check whether the effect of the variable for core countries is statistically different from 
that of non-core ones, we report the derivative of the dummies that represent the two groups of 
countries.  
First of all, we observe that the effect of the 1-Dcore variable, without interactions, on the shortfall 
of the AQR is positive and significant (Table 7, model I), while it is positive but not significant for the 
shortfall of the ST (Table 8, model I). This evidence suggests that banks located in non-core 
countries were characterized by adjustments in the AQR that induced a higher shortfall. This 
implies that either the adjustments were higher or the CET1 starting point was lower compared to 
other countries, or both.  
Looking at the interaction of Dcore and 1-Dcore with the exogenous variables we observe that in 
case of SF_AQR the absolute values of the coefficients associated with banks incorporated in core 
countries are higher than the coefficients associated with banks incorporated in non-core countries. 
A high CET1 ratio (model II) for a bank of a core country negatively affects the shortfall more than in 
the case of a bank of a peripheral country. With respect to non-performing exposures, we find that 
the effect is positive and significant in the case of peripheral countries, while it is negative and 
weakly significant for core countries (model IV). We also observe that the effect of the coverage 
ratio in core countries is negative and significant, while in peripheral countries it is not significant 
(model V). Moreover, we find that the marginal effect of bank with the headquarter in a core 
country, evaluated at the median value of interacted variables, is always negative and significant in 
the case of the interaction with cet1, npe and cr. In the case of peripheral countries, the derivate is 
negative and significant only for the interaction with cet1 and cr, with a magnitude lower than for 
the core countries.  
These results can be interpreted in two different ways: either as a signal national authorities in 
peripheral (core) countries were soft (severe) towards domestic banks before the CA exercise, or as 
evidence that the AQR was soft (severe) towards banks incorporated in core (non-core) countries.  
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The above results are not confirmed for SF_ST with the exception of the leverage ratio (Table 8, 
model III). This evidence suggests that the AQR was more severe (softer) with banks based in 
peripheral (core) countries, but there is no evidence concerning the ST. As a result, we may 
conclude, according to AQR, that banks in core countries either were better capitalized or were 
evaluated with cleaner balance sheets than those of other countries. In any case there is no 
evidence that the adverse ST scenario was more severe for peripheral countries. 
 
5. A closer look at the determinants of the shortfall 
In order to further investigate the determinants of the shortfall of the CA and in particular the role 
of the country of origin, we estimate (1) for the adjustments of the AQR (ADJ_AQR) and of the ST 
(ADJ_ST). In both cases we consider the adjustments over RWA. The difference between 
adjustments and shortfalls is that the former figures are obtained as the difference between the 
capital before and after the two exercises (AQR and ST); the latter are obtained as the positive part 
of the difference between a threshold (8% for AQR and 5.5% for ST in the adverse scenario) and the 
capital obtained after each exercise. As a consequence, the results on the shortfall depends on the 
starting level of capitalization of a bank while those on the adjustments do not. Therefore, looking 
at the results for the determinants of the adjustments and of the shortfalls we may provide insights 
into the level of capitalization before the CA and the design of the exercise. 
Regressions on the adjustments, based on the OLS estimator, are provided in Table 9. The analysis 
of the AQR shows weak evidence of bank-specific factors affecting the adjustment. As there is no 
reference to a threshold for the CET1 ratio, only cet1 is weakly significant in estimating the AQR 
adjustment (model I), while after adding rwa among regressors both cet1 and lr are not significant 
(model II). Two main results observed in the shortfall analysis are confirmed: ADJ_AQR is negatively 
affected by the capitalization of the stock exchange and is positively affected by the proportion of 
non-performing exposures. We can conclude that a poorer quality credit and a weaker supervision 
by the market are associated with a larger adjustment in the AQR. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
The picture changes significantly analysing the adjustment of the ST as a whole (models III-IV). First 
of all, the adjustment is larger in case of large banks, moreover both the cet1 and the lr positively 
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affects (with a statistically significant coefficient) the adjustment. Notice also that banks with a 
large proportion of non-performing exposures are characterized by small adjustments, and the 
level of market capitalization positively affects the adjustment of the ST.
30
  
From the evidence on the determinants of the adjustments of the ST, we can conclude that the ST 
was severe towards banks with high leverage/capital ratio, and therefore in a safer capital position 
and with good quality of credit. These results contrast with those obtained for the shortfall. It 
seems that the assessment was much more severe with solid banks than with banks in a weak 
condition; nevertheless, weaker banks were assigned higher shortfalls.  
The above results leave us apparently with a puzzle: on the one hand, the adjustment analysis 
shows that the ST was severe towards good banks, but on the other hand, these banks were indeed 
recipients of a small shortfall. Despite the soft approach of the ST towards weak banks in terms of 
adjustments, they ended up with a level of capital below the threshold with a significant shortfall. 
As a consequence, we can exclude the possibility that the final outcome was due to bias/extreme 
hypotheses of the ST. It seems that as in the case of the 2010 and of the 2011 exercise (see 
Greenlaw et al., 2012), the European STs run in 2014 appear too soft and allow for too much 
discretion. We can conclude that the CA’s results in terms of capital shortfalls are mainly driven by 
heterogeneity in the CET1 ratio starting point: banks with a riskier profile were also characterized 
by a lower initial capital buffer, as also shown by the bivariate relationships represented in Figures 1 
and 2. Relating this interpretation to the double standards apparently detected with respect to 
banks belonging to a core versus a non-core country, which affect the shortfall but not the 
adjustment, we may deduce that the capital buffer of weak banks located in peripheral countries 
before the CA was not well calibrated. In other word, our evidence rejects the hypothesis that the 
EBA and the ECB applied different standards among banks depending on their location. 
From this perspective, we can positively assess the harmonization of the different national 
approaches provided by the CA as a first step of the European Banking Union. The SSM should 
render the European banking system more resilient reducing the risk of political capture of 
regulators across Europe, both in the core and periphery countries (Beck, 2014). 
                                                           
30
 These models do not show any evidence of significant multicollinearity. However, when cet1, lr and rwa are 






The results of the CA raised a number of questions related to the fact that it was not neutral. In 
particular, two issues were discussed in the broad debate that has followed the publication of CA 
results: i) the CA was severe towards banks located in peripheral countries; ii) the CA was biased 
towards traditional credit activity. 
The analysis of the shortfall of the CA provided in this paper highlights that some factors affect the 
result besides the CET1 ratio starting point: i) banks located in non-core countries showed higher 
AQR shortfalls; moreover, ST was severe towards medium-sized banks in the sample; ii) poor credit 
quality and credit specialization are the main balance sheet features driving the shortfall, while the 
proportion of assets that are difficult to be evaluated plays no role. Moreover, we find that the 
CET1 ratio is significant in explaining the shortfall of the AQR, but not in explaining the shortfall of 
the ST. On the other hand, we find evidence that a less leveraged bank would experience a lower 
shortfall both in the ST. 
An analysis on CA adjustments has allowed to conclude that the assessment's outcome was mainly 
driven by the heterogeneity in the capital buffer by the end of 2013. It seems that banks with poor 
credit quality and/or located in peripheral countries were also characterized by a lower initial 
capital buffer. This feature resulted in a higher shortfall. As a consequence, and looking at the 
overall CA’s results, the hypothesis of a double standard applied by the EBA and the ECB depending 
on the location of banks should be rejected.  
Our analysis provides three main policy implications. First, it shows that by the end of 2013 there 
was a significant degree of heterogeneity among national regulatory/supervisory standards; in this 
context the CA and the European Banking Union aiming to build a level playing field in the banking 
sector mark an important step towards a unique financial market and an effective monetary policy.  
Second, our analysis of the CA outcome shows that the introduction of the leverage ratio in the 
new Basel III regulation is appropriate, as it transpires that a non-risk-adjusted capital measure is 
more closely related to capital shortfalls of stress tests than risk-adjusted capital measures. 
Moreover, our analysis shows that there is little evidence that CA was severe towards banks that 
adopted internal models. As the actual Basel III criteria on the leverage ratio appear rather light 
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(see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2015), the suggestion is to set a sharper constraint 
on the leverage ratio. 
Finally, this paper also suggests that ECB supervision needs to take a step forward in two directions: 
attention is still too concentrated on traditional credit activity rather than on financial assets and 
the design of the STs seems to be inadequate. Considering all these aspects, some doubts emerge 
about the capability of the CA to guarantee a sound European banking system. From this 
perspective, the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP), promoted by the EBA (2014) 
and ECB from 1 January 2016, seems to be a useful step as the experience of the Federal Reserve 
(2015) suggests. 
However, it should be remarked that our empirical analysis is based on a small sample of banks, 
even if it is large enough to represent the most part of the European banking market, and with 
balance sheet data referring to just one year (2013). In the next future, the EBA and the ECB should 
disclose more information on a larger sample of institutions to give the opportunity to have a more 






Acharya, Viral, Engle, Robert and Pierret, Diane (2014) Testing macroprudential stress tests: the risk 
of regulatory risk weights, Journal of Monetary Economics, 65: 36-53. 
Acharya, Viral and Steffen, Sascha (2014) Benchmarking the European Central Bank’s asset quality 
review and stress test: a tale of two leverage ratios, VOX, November 2014. 
Bank of Italy (2014) Results of the Comprehensive Assessment, press release available on 
https://goo.gl/ajWzNP. 
Barucci, Emilio, Baviera, Roberto and Milani, Carlo (2016) Is the Comprehensive Assessment able to 
capture banks’ risks?, Finance Research Letters 19: 98-104. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013a) Regulatory consistency assessment programme 
(RCAP) – Analysis of risk-weighted assets for credit risk in the banking book, mimeo. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013b) Regulatory consistency assessment programme 
(RCAP) – Analysis of risk-weighted assets for market risk, mimeo. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2015) Basel III, monitoring report, mimeo. 
Bayazitova, Dinara and Shivdasani, Anil (2011) Assessing TARP, Review of Financial Studies, 25: 377-
407. 
Beck, Thorsten (2014) After AQR and stress tests – where next for banking in the Eurozone?, VOX, 
November 2014. 
Beltratti, Andrea and Stultz, René M. (2012) The credit crisis around the globe: why did some banks 
perform better, Journal of Financial Economics, 105: 1-17. 
Beltratti, Andrea and Paladino, Giovanna (2013) Why do banks optimize risk weights? The relevance 
of the cost of equity capital, mimeo. 
Behn, Markus, Haselmann, Rainer and Vig, Vikrant (2014) The limits of model-based regulation, 
mimeo.  
Betz, Frank, Oprica, Silviu, Peltonen, Thomas and Sarlin, Peter (2013) Predicting distress in 
European banks, Journal of Banking & Finance, 45: 225-241. 
Bushman, Robert and Williams, Christopher (2012) Accounting discretion, loan loss provisioning, 
and discipline of banks’ risk taking, Journal of Accounting Economics, 54: 1-18. 
Cameron, A. Colin and Trivedi, Pravin K. (2005) Microeconometrics: methods and applications. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Cannata, Francesco, Casellina, Simone and Guidi, Gregorio (2012) Inside the labyrinth of Basel risk-
weighted assets: how not to get lost, Bank of Italy, occasional paper no. 132. 
 20 
 
Carboni, Marika, Fiordelisi, Franco, Ricci, Ornella and Lopes, Francesco Saverio Stentella (2017). 
Surprised or not surprised? The investors’ reaction to the comprehensive assessment preceding the 
launch of the banking union. Journal of Banking & Finance, 74, 122-132. 
Cong, Ronna (2000) Marginal effects of the tobit model. Stata Technical Bulletin 56: 27–34.  
Das, Sonali and Sy, Amadou (2012) How risky are banks’ risk weighted assets? Evidence from the 
financial crisis, IMF working paper. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli, Detragiache, Enrica and Merrouche, Ouarda (2013) Bank capital: lesson from 
the financial crisis, Journal of Money Credit and Banking, 45: 1147-1163 
Estrella, Arturo, Park, Sangkyun and Peristiani, Stavros (2002) Capital ratios and credit rating as 
predictors of bank failures, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, 6: 33-52. 
European Banking Authority (2011) EBA recommendation on the creation and supervisory oversight 
of temporary capital buffers to restore market confidence, available on http://goo.gl/JiFoCT. 
European Banking Authority (2013) Interim results update of the EBA review of the consistency of 
risk weighted assets, available on http://goo.gl/IeNuwX.  
European Banking Authority (2014) Guidelines on common procedures and methodologies for the 
supervisory review and evaluation process (SREP), EBA/GL/2014/13, available on 
https://goo.gl/YNTjJl. 
European Central Bank (2014a), Aggregate report on the comprehensive assessment, available on 
http://goo.gl/qgnqWU. 
European Central Bank (2014b) Institutions included in the comprehensive assessment, available on 
http://goo.gl/HV7UPo. 
European Central Bank (2014c), Template for the Comprehensive Assessment Outcome, available 
on http://goo.gl/2Kea0Y. 
Federal Reserve (2015) Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review 2015: Assessment Framework 
and Results. Federal Reserve, Washington DC. URL 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20150311a1.pdf. 
Fiordelisi, Franco, Ricci, Ornella and Lopes, Francesco Saverio Stentella (2017). The unintended 
consequences of the launch of the single supervisory mechanism in Europe. To Appear on Journal 
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 
Greenlaw, David, Kashyap, Anil K., Schoenholtz , Kermit L., and Shin, Hyun Song (2012) Stressed out: 
Macroprudential principles for stress testing. Chicago Booth Research Paper 12-08. 
Haldane, Andrew (2011) Capital discipline, Bank of England, mimeo. 
Haldane, Andrew (2012) The dog and the frisbee, Bank of England, mimeo.  
 21 
 
Huizinga, Harry and Laeven, Luc (2012) Bank valuation and accounting discretion during a financial 
crisis, Journal of Financial Economics, 106: 614-634.  
Laeven, Luc, Ratnovski, Lev, and Tong, Hui (2014) Bank size and systemic risk. IMF Staff Discussion 
Note, 14/04. 
Le Leslé, Vanessaand and Avramova, Sofiya (2012) Revisiting risk-weighted assets, IMF working 
paper, 12/90. 
Mariathasan, Mike and Merrouche, Ouarda (2012) Recapitalization, credit and liquidity, Economic 
Policy, 27: 603-646. 
Mariathasan, Mike and Merrouche, Ourada (2014) The manipulation of Basel risk weights, Journal 
of Financial Intermediation, 23: 300-321. 
Massaro, Fabrizio (2014) Dai derivati ai titoli di Stato, Corriere della Sera, October 29, 2014. 
Reuters (2017) Italy has done too little on banks' soured loans-ECB's Nouy tells paper, available on 
https://goo.gl/4mG7ES.  
Sahin, Cenkhan, and de Haan, Jakob (2016). Market reactions to the ECB’s Comprehensive 
Assessment. Economics Letters, 140, 1-5. 
Vallascas, Francesco and Hagendorff, Jens (2013) The risk sensitivity of capital requirements: 
evidence from an international sample of large banks, Review of Finance, 17: 1947-1988. 
Visco, Ignazio (2014) L’attuazione dell’Unione bancaria europea e il credito all’economia, Audizione 
del Governatore della Banca d’Italia, Camera dei Deputati, dicembre 2014. 
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. (2002) Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. Cambridge, 




List of Abbreviations 
ADJ_AQR Adjustment due to the AQR 
ADJ_ST Adjustment due to the ST adverse scenario 
AQR Asset Quality Review 
bps basis points (1 bp is equal to 0.01%) 
bn billion  
CA Comprehensive Assessment 
CET1 Common Equity Tier 1 
CR Coverage Ratio 
CRD/CRR Capital Requirements Directive/Capital Requirements Regulation 
CVA Credit Valuation Adjustment  
EBA European Banking Authority 
ECB European Central Bank 
LM test Lagrange-Multiplier test 
NPE Non Performing Exposure 
RWA Risk Weighted Asset 
SF_AQR Shortfall due to the AQR 
SF_ST Shortfall due to the ST adverse scenario 
SREP Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process 
SSM Single Supervisory Mechanism 
ST Stress Test 




Figures and Tables 
Figure 1. Relationship between non-performing exposures ratio (non performing loans over total loans) 
and CET1 ratio 
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Figure 2. Relationship between CET1 ratio and comprehensive assessment shortfalls 
 
Source: our elaborations on EBA and ECB data. 
 
Table 1 – Sample by country 
 
Number of banks 
ECB data EBA data 
Austria 6 6 
Belgium 6 5 
Cyprus 4 3 
Estonia 3 0 
Finland 3 1 
France 13 11 
Germany 25 24 
Greece 4 4 
Ireland 5 3 
Italy 15 15 
Latvia 3 1 
Lithuania 3 0 
Luxembourg 6 2 
Malta 2 1 
Netherlands 7 6 
Portugal 3 3 
Slovakia 3 0 
Slovenia 3 3 
Spain 15 15 
Total 129 103 
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Table 2 - Summary statistics and definitions of variables 
Variable Description Source Mean SD Min Max Obs 
ADJ_AQR 
Adjustments due to the AQR exercise 
over RWA (in %) 
ECB 
0.833 1.130 0.000 5.800 129 
ADJ_ST 
Adjustments due to the Adverse 
Scenario over RWA (in %) 
ECB and EBA 
8.090 8.330 -9.460 65.000 103 
cet1 Common Equity Tier 1 ratio (in %) ECB 14.500 8.790 -3.700 75.600 129 
cr 
Coverage ratio for non-performing 
exposure (in %) 
ECB 42.000 17.700 0.000 99.800 129 
Dcore 
Dummy equal to 1 for banks operating 
in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, 
France, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands (euro area core 
countries); 0 otherwise 
Own 
elaboration 
0.512 0.502 0.000 1.000 129 
Dirb 
Dummy equal to 1 for banks with a 
credit risk exposure, not adjusted for 
risk, under IRB models (F-IRB and A-
IRB) with over 50% of total credit risk 
exposure; 0 otherwise 
ECB and EBA 0.465 0.501 0.000 1.000 129 
Dmediumsize 
Dummy equal to 1 for banks with total 
assets in the second and third quartile 
of the distribution; 0 otherwise 
ECB 0.496 0.502 0.000 1.000 129 
Dlargesize 
Dummy equal to 1 for banks with total 
assets in the fourth quartile of the 
distribution; 0 otherwise 
ECB 0.256 0.438 0.000 1.000 129 
Drestruct 
Dummy equal to 1 for banks with 
restructuring plans approved before 31 
December 2013 (dynamic balance 
sheet assumption); 0 otherwise 
ECB 0.186 0.391 0.000 1.000 129 
homebias 
Credit risk exposure, not adjusted for 
risk, and government bond gross direct 
exposure over home domestic country 
total assets (in %) 
EBA 81.600 28.600 1.930 135.000 103 
level3 
Level 3 instruments for total assets (in 
%) 
ECB 0.789 1.530 0.000 10.000 129 
loan 
Total gross loans over total assets in 
2013 (in %) 
Bankscope 57.200 20.600 0.786 97.500 118 
lr 
Leverage ratio (common equity tier 1 
divided by total exposure measure 
according to Article 429 CRR) (in %) 
ECB 5.950 3.340 0.590 21.400 129 
marketcap 
Stock exchange market capitalization 
over nominal GDP (in %) 
World Bank 48.300 29.700 3.930 128.000 129 
npe Non-performing exposure ratio (in %) ECB 7.580 9.010 0.000 44.700 129 
rwa 
Total risk exposure (RWA) over total 
assets (in %) 
ECB 45.400 20.000 0.143 110.000 129 
SF_AQR 
Capital shortfall to threshold of 8% for 
AQR adjusted CET1 ratio (bn EUR) 
ECB 0.041 0.166 0.000 1.030 129 
SF_ST 
Capital shortfall to threshold of 5.5%  
in Adverse Scenario (bn EUR) 
ECB 0.188 0.671 0.000 4.630 129 
sys Total assets over nominal GDP (in %) 
ECB and 
World Bank 
28.600 35.900 0.491 180.000 129 
Notes: All data, with the exceptions of capital shortfalls, adjustments and post-AQR variables, refer to 2013.The Dexia lr 
variable is equal to CET1 capital over total assets due to missing data for the total exposure measured according to 
Article 429 CRR. 
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Table 3 – Summary statistics by country. Average values 
  AT BE CY DE EE ES FI FR GR IE 
ADJ_AQR 0.964 0.433 1.470 0.437 2.370 0.365 0.627 0.226 3.610 0.323 
ADJ_ST 6.990 7.930 -4.190 9.890 - 8.520 12.200 11.900 -1.570 5.170 
cet1 12.700 16.300 7.750 13.400 25.300 10.700 15.500 17.400 12.700 13.400 
cr 50.200 34.200 36.600 36.700 35.900 50.900 38.000 47.000 44.200 48.900 
Dirb 0.167 0.833 0.000 0.640 0.667 0.067 0.333 0.692 0.000 0.800 
Drestruct 0.167 0.500 0.250 0.160 0.000 0.600 0.000 0.077 0.000 0.200 
homebias 69.600 51.400 88.600 77.900 - 84.600 94.100 75.800 82.200 89.200 
lasset 4.090 4.520 2.530 4.510 1.020 4.730 4.500 5.380 4.460 4.490 
level3 0.953 1.470 0.185 0.657 0.001 0.333 0.416 0.927 0.202 0.184 
loan 51.800 41.900 80.700 46.300 78.100 64.000 59.700 51.200 76.400 76.400 
lr 6.380 2.790 6.590 4.620 16.200 5.170 5.980 5.340 7.470 7.460 
marketcap 26.900 62.100 8.770 43.400 10.400 75.200 64.200 69.800 18.000 51.800 
npe 5.770 2.190 28.700 2.770 3.700 9.080 1.500 2.570 32.600 19.300 
rwa 57.100 24.200 56.000 37.100 73.700 47.800 40.500 37.100 59.200 53.200 
SF_AQR 0.000 0.000 0.327 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.010 0.086 0.000 
SF_ST 0.144 0.090 0.591 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.180 0.171 
sys 26.000 32.700 91.600 6.680 24.600 20.300 72.400 25.100 48.300 73.800 
  IT LT LU LV MT NL PT SI SK 
ADJ_AQR 1.500 0.454 0.188 1.050 0.756 0.980 1.100 2.300 0.684  
ADJ_ST 3.750 - 11.700 7.100 8.550 19.300 6.080 5.740 -  
cet1 9.380 18.300 19.200 19.400 10.600 23.500 12.800 20.000 17.300 
cr 37.700 40.900 33.300 50.300 37.600 37.400 30.600 65.200 58.500 
Dirb 0.333 0.667 0.500 0.667 0.000 0.714 0.333 0.000 1.000 
Drestruct 0.067 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.143 0.667 0.000 0.000 
homebias 103.000 - 49.000 39.800 100.000 78.600 87.600 93.900 - 
lasset 4.360 1.630 2.980 1.420 1.820 5.200 4.240 1.820 2.380 
level3 0.708 0.163 0.558 4.780 0.000 0.403 4.330 1.690 0.139 
loan 65.200 68.300 17.200 53.600 55.500 70.700 67.400 50.200 67.400 
lr 5.080 11.100 6.680 10.600 5.270 3.750 6.730 8.570 7.390 
marketcap 23.900 9.360 128.000 3.930 41.000 84.500 30.900 14.300 5.050 
npe 11.000 8.520 0.648 4.550 5.260 1.770 12.700 17.900 3.900 
rwa 58.600 64.600 27.500 56.300 52.100 25.700 57.600 51.200 52.600 
SF_AQR 0.229 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SF_ST 0.628 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.379 0.022 0.000 
sys 9.730 15.400 50.800 18.000 86.900 51.100 45.000 20.100 15.100 




Table 4 – Correlation matrix 
  cet1 cr Dcore Dirb Dmediumsize Dlargesize Drestruct 
cet1 1.00             
cr -0.27 1.00           
Dcore -0.18 0.15 1.00         
Dirb 0.02 0.07 -0.29 1.00       
Dmediumsize -0.08 0.17 -0.25 0.31 1.00    
Dlargesize -0.01 -0.21 0.02 -0.18 -0.58 1.00  
Drestruct -0.12 -0.02 0.09 0.07 0.18 0.08 1.00 
homebias 0.11 -0.14 0.30 -0.33 -0.31 0.25 -0.05 
level3 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.03 
loan -0.04 -0.01 0.39 -0.18 -0.20 0.21 0.00 
lr 0.23 0.23 0.31 -0.06 -0.31 -0.07 -0.21 
marketcap 0.13 -0.05 -0.47 0.07 0.20 0.11 0.14 
npe -0.27 0.10 0.57 -0.20 -0.19 0.18 0.10 
rwa -0.30 0.38 0.49 -0.17 -0.27 0.02 -0.09 
sys -0.09 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.37 -0.25 0.02 
        
 homebias level3 loan lr marketcap npe rwa 
home_bias 1.00       
level3 -0.08 1.00          
loan 0.29 -0.11 1.00     
lr 0.23 0.11 0.27 1.00       
marketcap -0.20 -0.12 -0.10 -0.29 1.00     
npe 0.18 -0.01 0.49 0.20 -0.38 1.00   
rwa 0.16 0.09 0.44 0.61 -0.45 0.50 1.00 
sys -0.36 -0.01 0.10 0.01 0.13 0.22 -0.08 




Table 5. Regression results – reference model for capital shortfall (Tobit estimator) 
Model I II III IV V VI 
Dependent var. SF_AQR SF_AQR SF_AQR SF_ST SF_ST SF_ST 
cet1   -0.104*** -   -0.103***   -0.080*   - -0.004 
 [0.014]     [0.013]     [0.046]     [0.034]    
lr -   -0.175*** -0.062 -   -0.606***   -0.604*** 
 [0.051]     [0.040]     [0.143]     [0.145]    
Dmediumsize    0.608*** 0.124    0.499***    1.334**     0.847**     0.849**  
 [0.156]     [0.198]     [0.164]     [0.513]     [0.383]     [0.383]    
Dlargesize    0.870*** 0.300    0.780***    1.518*   0.666 0.658 
 [0.269]     [0.298]     [0.269]     [0.869]     [0.609]     [0.617]    
npe    0.037***    0.054***    0.035***    0.107***    0.159***    0.159*** 
 [0.010]     [0.015]     [0.010]     [0.038]     [0.031]     [0.032]    
cr   -0.020***   -0.020***   -0.014**  -0.012 0.009 0.010 
 [0.006]     [0.007]     [0.006]     [0.013]     [0.011]     [0.011]    
sys   -0.012***   -0.012***   -0.010***   -0.021**    -0.024***   -0.024*** 
 [0.003]     [0.003]     [0.003]     [0.010]     [0.008]     [0.008]    
marketcap   -0.016***   -0.022***   -0.017***   -0.044***   -0.057***   -0.057*** 
 [0.004]     [0.006]     [0.003]     [0.016]     [0.014]     [0.014]    
level3   -0.115*   -0.085 -0.055 0.059 -0.004 -0.003 
 [0.063]     [0.057]     [0.068]     [0.126]     [0.109]     [0.113]    
Drestruct    0.586***    0.531***    0.550***    0.936*      1.102**     1.107**  
 [0.214]     [0.201]     [0.180]     [0.552]     [0.496]     [0.505]    
Dirb   -0.246***   -0.475***   -0.278*** 0.235 0.019 0.031 
 [0.056]     [0.175]     [0.072]     [0.457]     [0.456]     [0.478]    
constant    1.333***    1.546***    1.509*** -0.181    1.907**     1.920**  
   [0.240]     [0.431]     [0.249]     [1.020]     [0.746]     [0.766]    
sigma    0.167***    0.361***    0.164***    1.317***    0.977***    0.977*** 
 [0.024]     [0.055]     [0.024]     [0.234]     [0.124]     [0.124]    
Collinearity diagnostics 
VIF (mean) 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.5 
Condition index 13.1 12.1 14.0 13.1 12.1 14.0 
LM test of Tobit specification  0.126 10.735 0.276 11.462 6.473 7.081 
[10.2; 13.4] [9.9; 13.7] [11.1; 14.3] [8.1; 12.0] [8.0; 11.8] [7.4; 10.9] 
Log-likelihood value 0.684 -15.165 1.650 -56.667 -44.925 -44.921 
Pseudo R-squared - 0.679 - 0.344 0.480 0.480 
F statistic (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.000 
Uncens. obs 16 16 16 23 23 23 
Obs 129 129 129 129 129 129 
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors appear in parentheses. 10% and 5% critical values for the LM test in parentheses. 
Pseudo R-squared is not reported for models I and III because is higher than 1 due to the positive value of log-likelihood 
in the full model and the negative value in the constant-only model. We use Stata13 for all calculations. 




Table 6. Regression results – Risk composition and capital shortfall (Tobit estimator) 
Model I II III IV V VI 
Dependent var. SF_AQR SF_AQR SF_AQR SF_ST SF_ST SF_ST 
cet1   -0.101***   -0.094***   -0.103*** 0.003 0.012 -0.005 
 [0.010]     [0.014]     [0.013]     [0.035]     [0.044]     [0.037]    
lr   -0.096**    -0.142*   -0.061   -0.644***   -0.660***   -0.576*** 
 [0.040]     [0.072]     [0.042]     [0.168]     [0.158]     [0.157]    
Dmediumsize    0.476***    0.425**     0.499***    0.766*      1.007**     0.800*   
 [0.156]     [0.186]     [0.165]     [0.436]     [0.418]     [0.423]    
Dlargesize    0.806***    0.640**     0.777*** 0.563    1.073*   0.537 
 [0.252]     [0.302]     [0.295]     [0.654]     [0.631]     [0.700]    
npe    0.040***    0.026*      0.035***    0.158***    0.143***    0.158*** 
 [0.012]     [0.015]     [0.010]     [0.033]     [0.031]     [0.035]    
cr   -0.017**  -0.009   -0.014**  0.009 0.016 0.011 
 [0.007]     [0.013]     [0.006]     [0.011]     [0.016]     [0.012]    
sys   -0.010***   -0.009**    -0.010***   -0.023***   -0.031***   -0.025*** 
 [0.003]     [0.004]     [0.003]     [0.008]     [0.006]     [0.008]    
marketcap   -0.012***   -0.022***   -0.017***   -0.055***   -0.074***   -0.057*** 
 [0.003]     [0.005]     [0.003]     [0.014]     [0.014]     [0.015]    
level3 -0.085 -0.050 -0.056 -0.017 0.035 -0.033 
 [0.063]     [0.098]     [0.069]     [0.112]     [0.106]     [0.136]    
Drestruct    0.500***    0.717***    0.550***    1.087**     1.926***    1.082**  
 [0.183]     [0.230]     [0.183]     [0.514]     [0.550]     [0.520]    
Dirb   -0.159*     -0.422***   -0.277*** 0.081 -0.412 0.143 
 [0.094]     [0.092]     [0.079]     [0.479]     [0.509]     [0.553]    
rwa    0.009*** - - 0.006 - - 
 [0.003]     [0.014]    
loan -    0.011**  - -    0.040*** - 
 [0.005]     [0.014]    
homebias - - 0.000 - - -0.003 
 [0.002]     [0.007]    
constant    1.110***    1.218***    1.495***    1.742**  -0.254    2.107*   
   [0.165]     [0.376]     [0.413]     [0.866]     [1.228]     [1.234]    
sigma    0.153***    0.157***    0.164***    0.982***    0.911***    0.979*** 
 [0.024]     [0.026]     [0.023]     [0.125]     [0.119]     [0.125]    
Collinearity diagnostics 
VIF (mean) 1.8 0.7 1.2 1.8 0.7 1.2 
Condition index 18.9 16.9 20.1 18.9 16.9 20.1 
LM test of Tobit specification  1.151 0.501 0.276 8.048 8.268 7.138 
[critical values: 10%; 5%] [14.5; 16.2] [13.7; 16.8] [12.6; 15.5] [7.9; 12.8] [9.2; 12.5] [9.9; 13.2] 
Log-likelihood value 3.664 3.185 1.650 -44.843 -37.331 -44.269 
Pseudo R-squared - - - 0.481 0.546 0.453 
F statistic (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Uncens. obs 16 15 16 23 22 23 
Obs 129 118 103 129 118 103 
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors appear in parentheses. 10% and 5% critical values for the LM test in parentheses. 
Pseudo R-squared is not reported for models I, II and III because is higher than 1 due to the positive value of log-
likelihood in the full model and the negative value in the constant-only model. We use Stata13 for all calculations.  




Table 7- Regression results – Core vs non-core country and capital shortfall in the AQR 
The table reports the estimation results based on the Tobit estimator.  
Dependent variable: SF_AQR 
Model I II III IV V 
cet1   -0.095*** -   -0.098***   -0.102***   -0.102*** 
 [0.011]     [0.017]     [0.013]     [0.014]    
lr -0.026 -0.028 - -0.027 -0.026 
 [0.043]     [0.047]     [0.047]     [0.046]    
Dmediumsize    0.538***    0.495***    0.524***    0.496***    0.504*** 
 [0.143]     [0.154]     [0.149]     [0.155]     [0.155]    
Dlargesize    0.920***    0.814***    0.843***    0.790***    0.780*** 
 [0.204]     [0.207]     [0.288]     [0.222]     [0.254]    
npe    0.029***    0.023***    0.026*** -    0.023*** 
 [0.008]     [0.007]     [0.009]     [0.008]    
cr   -0.027*** -0.013 -0.021 -0.012 - 
 [0.007]     [0.010]     [0.016]     [0.011]    
sys   -0.010***   -0.010***   -0.010***   -0.010***   -0.010*** 
 [0.002]     [0.002]     [0.002]     [0.002]     [0.002]    
marketcap   -0.015***   -0.019***   -0.017***   -0.019***   -0.019*** 
 [0.003]     [0.003]     [0.005]     [0.003]     [0.004]    
level3   -0.157**  -0.121   -0.145*   -0.123   -0.130*   
 [0.076]     [0.079]     [0.081]     [0.078]     [0.078]    
Drestruct    0.537***    0.688***    0.596**     0.689***    0.669*** 
 [0.150]     [0.154]     [0.233]     [0.171]     [0.209]    
Dirb   -0.196**    -0.213***   -0.179*     -0.196***   -0.177**  
 [0.090]     [0.068]     [0.103]     [0.074]     [0.086]    
1-Dcore    0.548**  -0.958 0.221 -0.110 -0.040 
 [0.218]     [0.716]     [0.835]     [0.438]     [0.567]    
cet1×Dcore -   -0.254*** - - - 
 [0.069]    
cet1×(1-Dcore) -   -0.102*** - - - 
 [0.012]    
lr×Dcore - - -0.112 - - 
 [0.208]    
lr×(1-Dcore) - - -0.025 - - 
 [0.045]    
npe×Dcore - - -   -0.176*   - 
 [0.103]    
npe×(1-Dcore) - - -    0.023*** - 
 [0.007]    
cr×Dcore - - - -   -0.034*** 
 [0.008]    
cr×(1-Dcore) - - - - -0.014 
 [0.013]    
constant    1.272***    2.532***    1.496**     1.677***    1.638*** 
  
 [0.226]   
sigma    0.135***















F statistic (p-value) 0.000
Uncens. obs 16 
Obs 129
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors appear in parentheses. 
Pseudo R-squared is not reported because is higher than 1 due to the positive value of log
the negative value in the constant-only 
median value of the Z control variable interacted with Dcore and (1





  [0.617]     [0.591]     [0.349]     [0.417]   
    0.130***    0.136***    0.131***    0.134***
]     [0.020]     [0.021]     [0.020]     [0.
 1.6 1.7 1.4 
 17.2 15.6 15.8 19.7
 0.079 0.080 0.047 0.030
 [11.1; 16.4] [11.0; 16.2] [13.5; 15.9] [11.5; 13.9]
-3.124*** -0.585 -0.703* -1.432***
-2.210*** 0.088 -0.018 -0.639***
 6.396 5.090 6.065 5.548
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
16 16 16 
 129 129 129 129
10% and 5% critical values for the LM test in 
-likelihood in the full model and 
model. We use Stata13 for all calculations. Derivatives are evaluated at the 
-Dcore). 



















Table 8- Regression results – Core vs non-core country and capital shortfall in the Stress Test 
The table reports the estimation results based on the Tobit estimator.  
Dependent variable: SF_ST 
Model I II III IV V 
cet1 -0.004 - -0.022 -0.013 0.002 
 [0.035]     [0.039]     [0.037]     [0.038]    
lr   -0.603***   -0.597*** -   -0.587***   -0.602*** 
 [0.145]     [0.144]     [0.144]     [0.146]    
Dmediumsize    0.848**     0.870**     1.015**     0.923**     0.787*   
 [0.383]     [0.391]     [0.402]     [0.399]     [0.427]    
Dlargesize 0.665 0.662 0.608 0.641 0.624 
 [0.620]     [0.609]     [0.638]     [0.636]     [0.662]    
npe    0.158***    0.156***    0.156*** -    0.160*** 
 [0.033]     [0.033]     [0.032]     [0.033]    
cr 0.009 0.011 0.016 0.011 - 
 [0.011]     [0.013]     [0.013]     [0.011]    
sys   -0.024***   -0.024***   -0.027***   -0.026***   -0.024*** 
 [0.008]     [0.008]     [0.008]     [0.008]     [0.008]    
marketcap   -0.056***   -0.057***   -0.065***   -0.059***   -0.055*** 
 [0.013]     [0.013]     [0.017]     [0.014]     [0.014]    
level3 -0.003 -0.002 -0.033 0.036 0.000 
 [0.113]     [0.110]     [0.109]     [0.102]     [0.113]    
Drestruct    1.100**     1.105**     1.427**     1.227**     1.083**  
 [0.503]     [0.490]     [0.648]     [0.534]     [0.502]    
Dirb 0.038 0.067 0.079 0.083 0.041 
 [0.488]     [0.487]     [0.502]     [0.495]     [0.489]    
1-Dcore 0.052 0.402 -1.159 -0.399 0.389 
 [0.466]     [0.858]     [1.205]     [0.544]     [1.277]    
cet1×Dcore - 0.014 - - - 
 [0.034]    
cet1×(1-Dcore) - -0.016 - - - 
 [0.043]    
lr×Dcore - -   -0.825*** - - 
 [0.246]    
lr×(1-Dcore) - -   -0.543*** - - 
 [0.164]    
npe×Dcore - - - 0.088 - 
 [0.068]    
npe×(1-Dcore) - - -    0.165*** - 
 [0.033]    
cr×Dcore - - - - 0.012 
 [0.016]    
cr×(1-Dcore) - - - - 0.004 
 [0.019]    
constant    1.882**  1.575    2.843**     2.140**  1.684 
 32 
 
 [0.780]     [1.016]     [1.192]     [0.820]     [1.160]    
sigma    0.977***    0.975***    0.981***    0.967***    0.977*** 
   [0.124]     [0.125]     [0.125]     [0.123]     [0.125]    
Collinearity diagnostics 
VIF (mean) 1.2 1.6 1.7 1.4 1.9 
Condition index 15.1 17.2 15.6 15.8 19.7 
LM test of Tobit specification  7.228 8.055 7.311 7.368 8.360 
[8.5; 12.9] [10.9; 14.5] [8.6; 14.3] [9.2; 12.8] [9.3; 14.3] 
-._/.012345 67 - 0.172 -4.301*** 0.352 0.530 
- ._/.0(
912345);7 - 0.203 -3.989*** 0.260 0.561 
Log-likelihood value -44.916 -44.852 -44.358 -44.451 -44.879 
Pseudo R-squared 0.480 0.481 0.487 0.486 0.481 
F statistic (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Uncens. obs 23 23 23 23 23 
Obs 129 129 129 129 129 
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors appear in parentheses. 10% and 5% critical values for the LM test in parentheses. 
We use Stata13 for all calculations.*, **, *** indicate statistical significance of the parameters at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance levels respectively. Derivatives are evaluated at the median value of the Z control variable interacted with 







Table 9. Regression results – Adjustments 
The table reports the estimation results based on the OLS estimator.  
Model I II III IV 
Dependent var. ADJ_AQR ADJ_AQR ADJ_ST ADJ_ST 
cet1    0.024*   0.023    0.791***    0.801*** 
 [0.014]     [0.016]     [0.056]     [0.059]    
lr -0.025 -0.023    0.596***    0.538*** 
 [0.052]     [0.054]     [0.145]     [0.201]    
Dmediumsize 0.036 0.036 0.418 0.380 
 [0.214]     [0.213]     [0.969]     [0.945]    
Dlargesize 0.066 0.067    2.132**     2.102**  
 [0.288]     [0.286]     [1.060]     [1.027]    
npe    0.066***    0.066***   -0.321***   -0.321*** 
 [0.022]     [0.023]     [0.066]     [0.067]    
cr -0.003 -0.003 -0.040 -0.042 
 [0.005]     [0.006]     [0.024]     [0.026]    
sys -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.003 
 [0.003]     [0.003]     [0.010]     [0.010]    
marketcap   -0.009***   -0.009***    0.043***    0.045*** 
 [0.003]     [0.003]     [0.015]     [0.016]    
level3 0.038 0.038 -0.158 -0.150 
 [0.061]     [0.061]     [0.209]     [0.221]    
Drestruct 0.033 0.032 -0.721 -0.722 
 [0.201]     [0.201]     [0.721]     [0.725]    
Dirb -0.087 -0.088   -1.382*     -1.333*   
 [0.193]     [0.195]     [0.707]     [0.700]    
Dcore 0.081 0.080 -0.967 -0.890 
 [0.195]     [0.188]     [0.806]     [0.813]    
rwa - -0.001 - 0.014 
 [0.009]     [0.032]    
constant 0.676 0.694   -2.709**    -3.194*   
   [0.417]     [0.579]     [1.103]     [1.655]    
Collinearity diagnostics 
VIF (mean) 1.620 1.900 1.620 1.900 
Condition index 14.868 19.824 14.868 19.824 
F statistic (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adj R-squared 0.292 0.286 0.888 0.887 
Obs 129 129 103 103 
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors appear in parentheses. We use Stata13 for all calculations. 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance of the parameters at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively. 
 
 
